Spain, Economic Crisis, and the New Enclosure of the Reproductive Commons by Ezquerra, Sandra
mo nt hlyreview.o rg
http://monthlyreview.org/2014/04/01/spain-economic-crisis-new-enclosure-reproductive-commons
Sandra Ezquerra more on Labor , Women's Studies/Feminism
Monthly Review | Spain, Economic Crisis, and the New
Enclosure of the Reproductive Commons
Sandra Ezquerra received her PhD in sociology f rom the University of  Oregon and is currently associate
prof essor at Universitat de Vic, in Barcelona. She would like to thank Jaume Franquesa, Marion Werner,
Daniel Albarracín, and Bibiana Medialdea f or their caref ul reading of  dif f erent draf ts of  the article and their
extremely helpf ul f eedback. Since her f irst language is not English, she also thanks Brian Anglo and Andreu
Coll f or their help and support translating this edit ion of  the text.
In the past f ew years numerous authors have examined how the current economic crisis in Spain has
dif f erential impacts on women and men.1 While this is important to show, this article’s goal is to make the
leap f rom a mere description of  the gendered effects of  the crisis, to an analysis of  some of  the very
gendered processes that shape it at its core. In other words, the intent is to understand how both the crisis
itself  and the ways the state manages it are structurally shaped by gender.2
This analysis will be based on a crit ical genealogy of  the classical Marxian concept of  primitive (or primary)
accumulation, which will be applied to the current economic context in Spain. It will be carried out in two
dif f erent ways. First, f ollowing Marxian theory and some f eminist theorists, it will be argued that primitive
accumulation crops up continuously throughout the history of  capitalism as a mechanism to overcome
crises of  accumulation. Second, based upon several f eminist authors’ crit ical analysis of  the concept, it will
be maintained that the primitive accumulation, or accumulation by dispossession, currently taking place in
Spain is deeply shaped by gender in the sense that one of  the main strategies capital develops, and the
state implements, is to push the responsibilit ies that the state f ormerly had f or public welf are back onto
women and households. This is what Maria Mies has called “rehousewif ization,”3 and what will be called
here a “new enclosure of  the reproductive commons.” This captures the f act that what had partially become
a public and collectively shared responsibility f or reproduction is now being imposed—as a result of  the
neoliberal management of  economic crisis—on women (individuals) and their unpaid labor in the household
(f amilies). Spanish labor market and household data indicate that there is an important dif f erence between
the gendered workings of  primitive accumulation f rom the f if teenth-to-eighteenth centuries, and current
ones. Although one of  its ef f ects back then was to exclude many women f rom the pool of  wage labor—
which is not meant to deny the huge role that women played in wage-based proletarianization during the
Industrial Revolution—at present it compels their entry into the labor market while simultaneously
exacerbating their unpaid reproductive burden at home. Accumulation by dispossession today places
Spanish women in the paradoxical situation of  becoming crucial economic actors while reinf orcing their
tradit ional care-giving roles in order to make up f or the state’s retreat f rom the public arena.
From Primitive Accumulation to Accumulation by Dispossession
Following the earlier classical economists, Karl Marx theorized what he called “so-called ‘primary
accumulation’” (mistranslated in the English edit ion of  Capital as “primitive accumulation”), occurring in
England between the f if teenth and eighteenth centuries.4 He saw this as constituting a precondition f or the
f ull development of  capitalist relations of  production and accumulation. Some of  its best known episodes
were the enclosures, including the usurpation of  communal lands; the expropriation of  Church property; the
slave trade; the pillage of  the Americas and the East Indies; and the “extirpation, enslavement, and
entombment in mines” of  indigenous peoples.5 Common to all of  this was the f orcef ul separation of  actual
producers f rom their means of  production and the concentration of  the latter in the hands of  the emerging
capitalist class. The transf ormation of  peasantry into wage-workers or proletarians, and the conversion of
their surplus labor into capital, constituted the essential premise behind the capitalist accumulation. All of
these processes were made possible to a great extent by state complicity.
Although Marx dealt with primary accumulation largely in terms of  the historical preconditions of  capitalism
(abstracting f rom them in his analysis of  capitalism’s internal laws of  motion), these practices have
continued throughout the history of  capitalism and are continuously brought up to date. David Harvey’s
discussion of  this in The New Imperialism was inspired in part by Luxemburg’s thesis that capitalism needed
the perpetual incorporation of  non-capitalist territories. Primitive accumulation was thus a continually
reoccurring reality within historical capitalism in the f orm of  colonial polit ics, the international credit system,
and wars. European imperialism saved capitalism f rom its own crisis through the expansion of  markets f or
capitalist commodities and the plundering of  labor f orce and resources beyond European borders.6
Harvey suggests that during overaccumulation crises, the predatory practices of  capitalism speed up and
take the f orm of  what he calls “accumulation by dispossession.” The credit system has intensif ied as an
accumulation mechanism through the centralization of  capital, corporate f raud, attacks on pension f unds,
and speculation. In addition, the global commons are being enclosed in new ways. Some instances of  this
are the development of  intellectual property rights, which are used against the very same people that
produced the materials; the depletion of  global environmental commons such as land, air, and water; the
commodif ication of  f ormer public assets such as universit ies and public services; and the deregulation and
privatization of  common property rights including public pensions, social services and public health
systems. Other mechanisms of  accumulation by dispossession have been implemented by structural
adjustment programs and through the creation of  debt crises in many countries. These processes make up
a new wave of  enclosures of  the commons which, as in the past, are enf orced with state complicity and
against people’s will.7
Gendering Accumulation by Dispossession
In recent decades, several authors have reviewed Marx, Luxemburg, and Harvey’s work f rom a crit ical
f eminist perspective.8 According to Maria Mies, f or instance, women, nature, and the peoples of
impoverished countries have made up the invisible base upon which the processes of  capitalist
accumulation have been historically established.9 Their subordination and exploitation continue to be
essential premises underlying the reproduction of  the current model and, theref ore, it is crucial to
understand the interactions, both historical and present, between the sexual, social, and international
divisions of  labor.10 Without denying the importance of  the separation of  producers f rom their means of
production, Mies takes a step f urther:
The strategy of  dividing the economy up into ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ sectors …has been the method of  the
capitalist accumulation right f rom its beginning. The invisible parts were per def init ion excluded f rom the
‘real’ economy. But they constituted in f act the very f oundations f or the visible economy. These excluded
parts were/are the internal and external colonies of  capital: the housewives in the industrialized countries
and the colonies in Af rica, Asia and Latin America.11
Along similar lines, Silvia Federici questions Marx’s understanding of  primitive accumulation as exclusively
f ocalized on the proletariat and the development of  commodity production. In her view, primitive
accumulation also needs to be understood as the development of  a new sexual division of  labor that
created divisions and hierarchies within the working class, theref ore binding women to the reproduction of
the labor f orce, and leading to their partial exclusion f rom wage labor and their subordination to men.
Capitalism was based not simply on proletarianization of  working class men and women, but also on the
f ictit ious separation between productive and reproductive work, their attribution to men and women
respectively, and the invisibilization and subordination of  women f or the sake of  men. Women were not only
dispossessed of  their control of  the means of  production, but also of  control over their own bodies. The
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century witch hunt, f or instance, was as important as the colonization and
expropriation of  European peasants f rom their land, since it destroyed “the control that women had
exercised over their reproductive f unction,”12 and promoted the creation of  a new subject/object that
during the nineteenth century would come to be known as “housewif e”—though, it should be added, that
this was always much more a middle- and upper-class reality than one that penetrated to working-class
women.
In Federici’s view, primitive accumulation has been a universal process the ruling class has launched during
each capitalist crisis in order to reduce wage labor costs and hide women’s and colonial subjects’
exploitation.13 During the f oundational context it drove women’s impoverishment, loss of  autonomy, and
their subordination to the so-called productive economy. In recent decades, institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund have brought accumulation by dispossession up to date through
the imposition of  programs based on social cutbacks, privatizations, and austerity that f oster “the
rationalization of  social reproduction aimed at destroying the last vestiges of  communal property and
community relations, and thereby impose more intense f orms of  labor exploitation.”14
Nancy Hartsock has also theorized contemporary global accumulation of  capital as a new momentum of
primitive accumulation which violently divests a growing number of  people of  their ability to produce their
own subsistence and guarantees the concentration of  capital in increasingly f ewer hands. Far f rom being
gender neutral, the current processes of  accumulation by dispossession drive women’s entry into paid
work and use it f or the creation of  the f eminized working-class contemporary capitalist f lexible
accumulation requires. As women have been drawn into the international labor f orce, men have also been
f orced increasingly to work under conditions previously primarily associated with women workers (such as
growing f lexibility and precariousness and part- t ime jobs).15 The f eminization of  the labor f orce theref ore
causes increasing degradation of  the working class. It also poses, according to Hartsock, contradictory
problems and possibilit ies f or women. On the one hand, they have been entering global capitalism in
disadvantageous conditions in comparison with men. On the other hand, this incorporation increases their
autonomy and allows them to f ree themselves f rom some f orms of  patriarchal oppression.
Nancy Hartsock shows that current accumulation by dispossession operates in irregular waves and
through numerous interrelated processes, some of  which have deepened during the past thirty years. First,
it increases social inequalit ies and impoverishment on a global scale. Second, the breaking and
transf ormation of  the social contract redef ines social relations between polit ical power, capital, labor, and,
among others, the population’s expectation of  common goods and public services. Third, current
accumulation by dispossession also entails a transf ormation of  the processes of  social reproduction and
the whole set of  social relations that shape them. These three processes are possible due to a number of
ideological changes stemming f rom the rise of  both neoliberalism and neoconservatism.
Economic Crisis and the Enclosure of  the Reproductive Commons in Spain
Joan Acker is correct when she states that the starting point of  our examination must be “the material
conditions of  lif e and the relations involved in the production of  those conditions in particular historical
moments.”16 Taking this into consideration, and building upon Mies, Federici and Hartsock’s arguments,
some of  the dimensions of  Spain’s current economic crisis will be analyzed. In doing so, the
transf ormations that have taken place in the labor market and reproduction relations in recent decades will
be specif ically f ocused upon. The thesis is that the crisis leads to a new momentum of  accumulation by
dispossession prof oundly marked by gender; one in which capital attempts to leave the crisis behind
through a new enclosure of  the reproductive commons. This process, nevertheless, takes place in dif f erent
ways than it did in the past. While reproductive responsibilit ies are being returned to the f undamental
invisible base of  the economic system (i.e., women’s unpaid labor), capital at the same time is increasingly
resorting to women’s paid labor in the job market. However, this analysis dif f ers f rom Hartsock’s, since it is
argued that the current crisis does not unequivocally emancipate women in Spain through their entry into
the labor market but, on the contrary, it revives tradit ional gender oppressions and merges them with more
recent ones.
Focusing specif ically on Spain, it is worth brief ly emphasizing two issues: the singularit ies of  both its
current economic crisis and the history of  its welf are state. While the outbreak of  the Spanish economic
crisis in 2008 resulted f rom the international f inancial crisis, its ef f ects were aggravated by a number of
previously existing f actors. In the past thirty years, Spain has undergone a similar neoliberal restructuring to
the rest of  the world. Some of  the particular legacies of  the f orty-year- long dictatorship which ended in
1978, however, are the enormous power retained by conservative authoritarian f orces, a highly precarious
labor market, huge social inequalit ies, a very powerf ul banking system in comparison with the country’s
European neighbors, a highly regressive and inadequate tax system, and a poor social protection structure.
In the mid–1970s Spain was f ar below the European standards of  social welf are and the f irst democratic
governments had to f ace the challenge to build social-welf are structures in an international context that
pushed toward their dismantling.
While public social spending increased during the 1980s, it started to decline again af ter Spain joined the
European Union in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty requirement of  def icit reduction was pursued by cutting
back social spending, and by 2002 the Spanish social spending def icit was back to its 1975 level of  7.2
percent of  GDP.17 Entry into the European Community and the Monetary Union as a semi-peripheral
economy put large parts of  the Spanish economy in the hands of  f oreign capital, limited national autonomy
f or macroeconomic decisions, consolidated a dependent productive model, caused productivity to
stagnate, and turned Spain’s f oreign def icit into one of  the highest in the world.18 Massive privatization of
public companies strengthened in turn the oligarchic character of  the economy, which thereaf ter
increasingly specialized in f inances, tourism, services, and construction.
The construction sector grew exponentially between 1995 and 2007 due to both strong public support
(through investments and tax benef its) and exorbitant private indebtedness. Spain is one of  the countries
with the largest social inequalit ies in Europe and where private indebtedness has grown the most. The
f inancialization process has acted as an income transf er device: whereas in 1960 wages’ share of  national
GDP was 68 percent, in 2008 it had f allen to 60.21 percent and by 2012 it had gone down to 52.3 percent. In
addition, during the ten years prior to the bursting of  the housing bubble, f amilies’ and businesses’
indebtedness tripled f rom 61 percent of  income in 1997 to 139 percent in 2007.19 The bubble burst as a
result of  the exorbitant growth of  private debt; the impossibility of  indef inite inf lation of  housing prices; the
inability to control external imbalances due to external markets’ loss of  trust; increasing social inequalit ies
that helped to weaken internal markets; f inancial, monetary, and tax policies aimed at stimulating
indebtedness; and the indif f erence of  both the right-wing and social-  democratic Spanish administrations
toward the unsustainability of  a growth model based on “bricks and mortar.”
The Spanish government has made a considerable ef f ort since 2008 to deal with the crisis, reduce
skyrocketing unemployment rates, and help the banking system to pay its f oreign creditors. While it soon
dropped its t imid neo-Keynesian policies to create jobs, by mid–2009 Spain was the OECD country that had
spent the most public resources on rescuing banks (2 percent of  GDP).20 Within a short period of  t ime, the
public def icit shot up and so did the public debt, result ing in the so-called debt crisis beginning in 2010. The
government has had to resort to “the markets” (banks and investment groups), result ing in exorbitant
interest rates on public debt, f orcing severe structural ref orms in areas such as the labor market, public
pensions, universit ies, the health care system, and social programs.
At the end of  2013 Spain’s unemployment rate was 26 percent, yet the government was still set on
achieving the EU and the Spanish Constitution mandates to keep the def icit below 3 percent through the
suppression of  already meager basic public benef its and services. Whereas in 2010 Spanish GDP was 94
percent of  the EU-15 average, its social spending was only 72 percent of  the EU-15 average and has
drastically declined since then. Some of  the biggest weaknesses of  the Spanish welf are state are in f amily
support services. For instance, only 10 percent of  children aged two years or less in Spain benef it f rom
public daycare (in comparison with 28 percent in the EU-15 and 58 percent in Sweden). In 2004 only 2
percent of  potential clients received in-home support services f or the elderly and disabled in comparison
with EU-15’s 18 percent and Sweden’s 23 percent. As opposed to other welf are regimes in Europe, the
Spanish social system has largely relied on f amilies, and particularly women, to make up f or its
def iciencies.21 As detailed below, this scenario is worsening with the current economic crisis and triggering
transf ormations both in the labor market and in reproduction relations.
As shown in Chart 1, the Spanish f emale economically active population rate has grown markedly since the
1970s: whereas in 1976 it was 28.67 percent, by 1994 it had increased to 37.09 percent. Since the early
2000s it has continued to increase steadily and this trend did not change af ter the outbreak of  the crisis in
2008. In the third quarter of  2013 women’s economic activity rate was 53.31 percent, almost doubling the
f igures of  the mid–1970s. This contrasts with the decline of  male economic activity in recent decades: the
1976 male activity rate was as high as 77.80 percent, but thereaf ter f ollowed a constantly declining trend
until the mid–1990s. It reached its lowest point, 62.75 percent, in 1995. One year later, however, it started to
climb again as a result of  the exponential growth of  the construction sector and the housing bubble,
reaching a new peak of  69.21 percent in 2008. Since the outbreak of  the crisis, nevertheless, it has not
stopped dropping and by the third quarter of  2013 it had f allen to 65.90 percent,22 which means that it is
not only lower than in 2008, but twelve points lower than in 1976. The massive destruction of  male
employment over the past f ew decades, and particularly in the past f ive years,23 has been paralleled by an
intensif ication of  women’s incorporation into the labor market and, presumably, growing dependency of
f amilies on f emale wages.
Chart 1. Economic Activity Rates by Gender in Spain, 1976–2012.
Sources: Compiled by the author f rom Spanish Active Population Survey data. The so-called active
population is the total amount of  people who are sixteen and older and either have a job or are unemployed
and look f or a job. The labor activity rate results f rom dividing the total amount of  the active population by
the total amount of  population who are sixteen and older. It is published every quarter by the Spanish
National Institute of  Statistics.
If  we turn to the employment-population ratio, as shown in Chart 2, in 1976 the male and f emale rates were
71.60 percent and 28.39 percent respectively. Although they both declined up to the mid–1980s, male
employment rates did so much more rapidly, f alling almost 15 points by 1985, while women’s rates f ell by
half  of  this f igure in the same period. Since then, the predominant trend has been f or the male employment-
population ratio to decline, rising occasionally during periods of  economic growth such as the already
mentioned housing bubble, but never recovering its mid–1970s level. By 2007 it was 64.86 percent and has
sharply declined again since, reaching 50.66 percent in the third quarter of  2012. In contrast, the f emale
ratio has steadily grown since the mid–1980s despite a brief  interruption in the early 1990s. In 1993 it was
25.5 percent, but by 2007, just bef ore the outbreak of  the crisis, it had gone up to 43.63 percent. Since then
it has lost three points, reaching 40.3 percent in 2012, in contrast with the recent f ourteen-point decline in
the male ratio. If  this trend continues, in a f ew years men and women may have an equal presence in the
Spanish labor market. Needless to say, equality in terms of  numbers, but not conditions, is meant: women in
Spain continue to suf f er wage discrimination, vertical and horizontal segregation in the labor market, and,
among other problems, are heavily concentrated in part- t ime and temporary jobs.24
Chart 2. Employment-Population Ratio by Gender in Spain, 1976-2012
Sources:Compiled by the author f rom Spanish Active Population Survey data. The employment rate is the
result f rom dividing the total amount of  people who have a job by the total amount of  people who are
sixteen or older. It is published every quarter by the Spanish National Institute of  Statistics.
In contrast to the decreasing availability of  Spanish women to shoulder domestic and caregiving
responsibilit ies, lif e-expectancy growth and population-ageing in recent years have led to increased care
needs. First, the proportion of  over-sixty- f ours has gone up f rom 10.45 percent in 1975 to 15.11 percent in
1995, 16.80 percent in 2005, and 17.38 percent in 2012. Second, the average age of  the Spanish population
has increased f rom 33.13 years in 1975 to 38.12 in 1995, 40.40 in 2005, and 41.24 in 2011. Third, the
Spanish Ageing Index has grown f rom 35.87 percent in 1975 to 81.92 percent in 1995, 108.20 percent in
2005, and 109.53 percent in 2013.25 Lastly, the Elderly Dependency Rate has gone up f rom 17.29 percent in
1975, 22.75 percent in 1995, 24.81 percent in 2005, and 26.66 percent in 2013.26 This scenario raises the
question of  the ef f ects the f eminization of  labor has on the tradit ional organization of  care and social
reproduction relations.27
Neither women’s “entry” into the labor market nor men’s “exit” f rom it has led to a redistribution of  domestic
and care responsibilit ies within households. According to the 2009–2010 Spanish Time Use Survey, women
still spend two hours a day more than men on household work. While the dif f erence decreased by f orty
minutes between 2002 and 2009 there still exists a dif f erence of  17 percent in terms of  participation in
unpaid work (74.4 percent f or men and 91.9 f or women). The same survey shows that 93 percent of  women
consider themselves to be active in “household and f amily” while the f igure f or men is 75 percent and other
studies argue that, f ar f rom “f reeing” women f rom unpaid domestic work, unemployed men “at home” tend
to become an additional burden and responsibility f or women who also work in the paid labor market.28
Moreover, f amilies’ current expense-cutting strategies and f ewer available resources to pay f or caregiving
and domestic services (mostly conducted by women as well) expand the amount of  unpaid household work,
increase many women’s total work burden, and reinf orce their “double shif t.”29 In addition, as mentioned
above, the f eminization of  employment and the care void it has generated within households have been
accompanied during the past decades by a drastic reduction in public social expenditure.30 This
retrenchment has severely sharpened in Spain since the outbreak of  the 2010 so-called public debt crisis.31
Formerly public services such as higher education and health care are increasingly managed f rom a prof it-
oriented approach and theref ore become the object of  new enclosures through big hikes in college tuit ion
and, among other things, the introduction of  co-payment in public health care. Although in 2006 the
previous social-democrat government passed a law providing f or universal in-home supportive services f or
the elderly and the disabled, in 2010 it started to cut down the already meager budget allocation to
implement it. The current conservative government has, on the one hand, partially privatized the services
and, on the other hand, de f acto f rozen and in ef f ect repealed the law. Retirement pensions are being cut,
retirement age is being raised, and parental leaves and rights are being eroded. Other privatization
processes are currently f ocused on daycare, f orcing f amilies to turn to more expensive private services or
provide it themselves through f ree f amily work.
Although these measures af f ect the vast majority of  the population, some of  them have a particularly
severe impact on women because of  the heavy concentration of  women as paid workers in public sectors
such as health, education, and social services. Also, women’s greater labor and economic vulnerability
makes them suf f er more acutely the attacks on social expenditure and public social services. The
f undamental gender dimension of  the current neoliberal response to the crisis, nonetheless, is that as the
state retreats f rom numerous reproductive responsibilit ies, and without a redistribution of  such
responsibilit ies within households, it is f amilies, and particularly women within them, who take on these
tasks again in the f orm of  unpaid work in the home or what Mies calls the invisible f oundation of  the
economy, and Federici a new rationalization of  social reproduction. This rehousewif ization of  reproduction
has intensif ied in Spain since the outbreak of  the so-called debt crisis in 2010 and constitutes a central
aspect of  the current accumulation by dispossession, since it is in households where, as Pérez Orozco
points out, the “f inal adjustment” takes place and allows f or a new enclosure of  the reproductive
commons.32
As f eminist crit ics have argued, the new enclosure of  the commons does not take place only through
commodif ication processes, but also through the absorption of  the costs of  the tip of  the capitalist
economy by its very invisible base: the reproductive realm. The current systemic crisis accelerates the
growth of  the care void and the social reproduction crisis engendered throughout years of  neoliberal
hegemony and drops it on women’s backs. Unlike at other t imes in history, this does not trigger women’s
retreat f rom the so-called productive economy, but actually goes hand in hand with an increase in the
importance of  their economic role. Contrary to what Hartsock suggests, however, women’s growing
presence in the labor market does not necessarily lead to greater autonomy or liberation f rom caregiving
responsibilit ies. Rather, their growing role as breadwinners intersects with the recovery of  tradit ional
gender roles that seemed to have been partially overcome and the creation of  new oppressions through
their specif ic overexploitation in the labor market, and results in an increase in their overall workload. The
growth of  women’s total workload as a result of  the neoliberal management of  the crisis does not
constitute a mere, allegedly inevitable, short- term collateral ef f ect. It results f rom a polit ical and economic
strategy of  privatization and rehousewif ization of  reproduction in order to guarantee the survival of  what
is considered the real economy that is worth saving.
The New Struggle Over the Reproductive Commons
There has never been a moment where capitalism has not been f ully dependent on unpaid reproductive
work done mostly by women. The shape this dependency adopts, nevertheless, varies according to the
historical context and, in dif f erent degrees, partly as a result of  multiple social and polit ical struggles, can
be shared by the state and markets. The aim of  this article has been to show, through an examination of
the Spanish case, that the current economic crisis allows the state to get rid of  part of  its share of  social
reproduction and return it to the invisible base where it originally resided: women’s unpaid labor. This
process can be called a “new enclosure of  the reproductive commons.” As opposed to some other
moments in the history of  capitalism, however, this does not result in the exclusion of  women f rom the
labor market, but, rather, in their increased presence in it.
Although this article has f ocused on some of  the material and polit ical dimensions of  this new enclosure,
f urther research and analysis are needed in order to understand how this is currently accompanied and
f acilitated by ideological processes that f use neoliberal principles of  f ree market, competit iveness, and
austerity with the rhetoric and def ense of  tradit ional values. As Cindi Katz argues,33 globalization
def enders of ten f orget the ruling classes’ ability to build powerf ul alliances with patriarchal, homophobic,
racist, and religious f undamentalist options.34 The Spanish neoconservative movement has its own
particularit ies, which combine economic liberalism with Spanish patriotism and Christian values. Strongly
allied with the Spanish Catholic church, it violently targets issues such as abortion and gay marriage.
Currently part of  the conservative administration, Spanish neoconservatism argues that the problems of
Spanish society do not have polit ical or economic roots, but rather moral ones, and contemporary social
crises stem f rom the destruction of  the institution where the most f undamental moral principles reside: the
f amily.35 Conservative leader Javier Arenas, f or instance, publicly said in March 2012 that the government
should endeavor to “recover f amily values that have been lost since women have worked.” For him,
women’s return to the home is desirable since “there won’t be so many marriage breakdowns, young people
will stop going astray, f amilies will f it  back into tradit ional models, and even employment will pick up again” in
a process that some have called woman-woman’s return to woman-mother.36 Along similar lines, also in
2012 the current Minister of  Justice recently stated that motherhood makes women authentically women,
and announced the current government’s intention to toughen the law on abortion in 2014.37 If  successf ul,
the ref orm would take Spanish women’s sexual and reproductive rights back to the 1970s.
Overwhelmed by neoliberal hegemony, many may see the f amily or morality today as the last ref uges f rom
crisis and dispossession. The Spanish neoconservative right mobilizes these emotions and def ends the
f amily, homophobia, and religion, and wars against abortion and amorality. Paradoxically, this parallels a
large-scale economic strategy aimed at draining the commons in f avor of  the ruling classes.38 It is here
where the dialectical relationship between the material and ideological realms emerges. The current Spanish
conservative administration sharpens the austerity measures launched by the previous social-democrat
government and promotes the resurrection of  f amilies (and within them women) as a source of  support
and care that make up f or the state’s growing evasion of  social responsibility. The f amily they turn to,
nevertheless, cannot be of  any kind but the heterosexual-patriarchal one, which abides by, and reproduces,
the sexual division of  labor. This f amily subsidizes not only the state. It also subsidizes an economic
system that is going to rack and ruin. In short, it plays a key role in setting up new strategies of
accumulation by dispossession in order to allow capital to survive the crisis that its own contradictions
have generated.
While this leads to an erosion of  women’s and people’s social and labor rights, it also poses an
opportunity to ref lect on the role reproductive, domestic, and caregiving work have historically had in the
capitalist system and to imagine new ways of  organizing them which do not necessarily entail f resh
enclosures of  these commons, but the possibility of  actually sharing, enjoying, and valuing them. The
current crisis is deep, and so is the dispossession. However, important resistance and counterhegemonic
phenomena such as the 15M movement (the Indignados) in Spain, inspired by the Arab Spring, remind us
that there is still much hope and, f ortunately, still also a lot of  history to be written—and made.
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